We consider an online assortment problem with [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n} sellers, each holding exactly one item i ∈ [n] of initial inventory ci ∈ Z+, and a sequence of homogeneous buyers arriving over a finite time horizon t = 1, 2, . . . , m. There is an online platform whose goal is to offer a subset St ⊆ [n] of sellers to the arriving buyer at time t to maximize the expected revenue derived over the entire horizon while respecting the inventory constraints. Given an assortment St at time t, it is assumed that the buyer will select an item from St based on the well-known multinomial logit model, a well-justified choice model from the economic literature. In particular, in this model, the revenue obtained from selling an item i at a given time t critically depends on the assortment St offered at that time and is given by the Nash equilibrium of a Bertrand game played among the sellers in St. This imposes a strong dependence/externality between the offered assortments, items revenues, and inventory levels. Despite these challenges, we devise the first constant factor competitive algorithm for the online platform. This answers a question in [1] that considered the static version of this problem with only one buyer and no inventory constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the rapid growth of the internet and online markets such as Amazon, eBay, Airbnb, and Uber, the influence of online platforms on our daily decision making is inevitable. Moreover, online platforms play a major role in revenue management and supply-demand using careful pricing mechanisms. For instance, when a customer searches for a specific item (e.g., a TV) in an online marketplace such as Amazon.com, the platform decides on the list of products to display. Similarly, when booking a room using Hotels.com or Orbitz.com, the online platform offers a list of available rooms from different hotels based on the searched data. As a result, depending on what list of items are offered, the online platform can obtain different revenue from potential buyers while meeting their demands using the available items. In fact, based on the global survey [2] , the total market value of online platforms is growing rapidly and exceeding a net value of 4.3 trillion dollars worldwide.
In general, one can identify two classes of online platforms based on their operation mechanism [1] . The first one, known as full control model, allows the platform to have full control over offered assortments, prices, and the underlying supplydemand matching algorithms. As an example of the full This work is supported by NSF Career Award, NSF-ECCS-1944403. control model, one can consider Uber that not only offers the rides to the passengers but also sets the prices based on a revenue-maximizing optimization algorithm. In the second model, known as discriminatory control model, the platform has only control over the set of displayed items, and the prices or potential matches are determined endogenously based on customers' choices. Perhaps, Airbnb is a good example of a discriminatory control model where it only displays a list of available rooms to the customers and the renting prices are determined by the competition among the property owners.
In this paper, we analyze a discriminatory control model for the online marketplace. More precisely, we consider a model in which each indivisible item has a limited inventory and a certain quality that can be owned by a seller. As each item is owned by exactly one seller, we often refer to items and sellers interchangeably. Moreover, there is an online platform that can decide on what set of sellers to display to each upcoming buyer. This induces a competition among the displayed sellers to set their item prices, where the optimal prices are given by the Nash equilibrium of the Bertrand game induced by the set of displayed sellers. Given these equilibrium prices, the buyer selects an item based on the multinomial logit model or decides to leave the market without any purchase. Therefore, we are interested in devising an efficiently computable policy for the online platform to maximize the aggregate revenue of all the sellers over the entire horizon. In particular, we want our algorithm to be competitive with respect to the best in-hindsight policy that knows the total number of buyers a priori while respecting the inventory constraints.
Design of online marketplace with different objectives has been studied in the past literature [3] - [6] . However, unlike prior work [4] , [5] which use monotone distributions functions to capture supply and demand curves, we use the wellknown multinomial logit (MNL) model [7] - [9] to capture buyers' choice behavior. This, in turn, allows us to describe buyers' demands in terms of purchase probabilities of substitutable items. Using such demand functions, the competition among displayed sellers is captured using the Bertrand game which has been extensively studied in economic literature [10] , [11] for modeling oligopolistic competition in actual markets. Perhaps, our work is most related to [1] in which the static version of the problem studied here was considered, i.e., when there is only one buyer and there are no inventory constraints. It was shown in [1] that the revenue function posses a nice quasi-convex property which allows one to find the optimal assortment efficiently in a one-shot market. In particular, the authors raised the question of designing an optimal dynamic mechanism, where the buyers arrive and depart, and the sellers have limited capacity for products. In this paper, we answer this question by devising the first constant factor competitive algorithm which is efficiently computable in real-time.
This work is also closely related to dynamic online assortment [12] - [17] , and dynamic revenue management [18] - [22] , where broadly speaking the goal is to dynamically choose assortments/prices in order to maximize the aggregate revenue obtained by selling items subject to inventory constraints. Such problems have been extensively studied under various settings such as stochastic demand arrival model [18] , [21] , [22] , adversarial demand model where the sequence of buyers' types can be chosen adversarially [12] , and reusable items where an allocated product can be returned to the inventory after some random time [15] , [16] . We refer to [23] for a comprehensive survey on recent advances on dynamic pricing and inventory management problems.
On the other hand, other than a handful of results [14] , [24] , [25] , the effect of competition or externalities in dynamic assortment problems has not been fully addressed before. Moreover, almost all the earlier results on dynamic online assortment (see, e.g., [12] , [13] , [18] ) consider fixedrevenue items, meaning that the revenue which is obtained from selling an item is fixed and does not depend on the offered assortments. This allows linear programming (LP) techniques such as dual-fitting quite amenable for designing competitive online algorithms and has been used in several earlier works [12] , [16] . Unfortunately, the dependence of items revenues on the offered assortments creates extra externalities that make the use of conventional methods such as dual-fitting or dynamic programming formulations more complex. To handle such externalities, in this work we take a different approach and use a novel charging argument which allows us to compare the revenue obtained from our online algorithm with that of the optimal offline benchmark.
It is worth mentioning that our work is also related to online learning for LPs with packing constraints [26] - [28] . This is because one can use an offline LP with packing constraints to upper bound the revenue of the optimal offline algorithm. As a result, generating a feasible solution to such LP in an online fashion whose objective value is competitive to the offline LP will automatically deliver a competitive online algorithm for our problem. Leveraging this idea, a typical approach is to dynamically learn/estimate the dual variables of the offline LP using some black-box online learning algorithms (e.g., multiplicative weight update rule [28] ), and use the estimated dual variables to guide the primal solution generated by the algorithm. However, the LP formulation in our setting has exponentially many variables that are associated with all the feasible assortments. Therefore, it is not very clear without an extra effort that how this approach can be used to compute a competitive online policy in polynomial time.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider an online assortment problem with [n] := {1, . . . , n} sellers, where the ith seller holds item i ∈ [n] with an initial inventory c i ∈ Z + . As each item is assigned to exactly one seller, throughout this paper we use the terms sellers and items interchangeably. Each item i ∈ [n] has a fixed quality θ i ≥ 0, and without loss of generality we assume that the items are sorted according to their qualities, i.e., θ 1 ≥ . . . ≥ θ n . We consider a sequence of homogeneous buyers that arrive at discrete time instances t = 1, 2, . . . , m, for some unknown integer m ∈ Z + . As in [1] , [6] , we adopt the random utility model for purchase probability of the buyers. In the random utility model the buyer has a private random preference ζ i about the ith item. Given a vector of posted pricesp = (p 1 , . . . ,p n ) on the items, the buyer derives utility
Here by convention we also define a "no purchase" item {0} with p 0 = θ 0 = 0, to represent the case where the buyer decides to leave without any purchase. Therefore, the buyer purchases item i with the highest utility, i.e., i = argmax j∈[n]∪{0} u j , where ties are broken arbitrarily. In particular, under the assumption that ζ i are i.i.d random variables with Gumbel distribution, we obtain the wellknown multinomial logit (MNL) purchase probabilities [7] - [9] , given bȳ
The probabilityq i (p) can also be viewed as the expected demand of the buyer for item i for posted pricesp.
In this paper, we consider a discriminatory control model where upon arrival of a buyer, the online platform can only decide on what subset of items to display to the buyer. However, the platform has no control over the posted prices and they are determined endogenously by the competition among the displayed sellers. To capture the competition among the sellers, we use Bertrand competition game [1] , [10] , [11] , where the seller of each item sets a price to maximize its own revenue. More precisely, let S ⊆ [n] be the set of items that are displayed by the online platform to a specific buyer. Consider a Bertrand game between the sellers (players) in S, where an action for seller i is to set a pricep i ≥ 0 on its item. Given the profile of pricesp(S) := (p i , i ∈ S), the revenue of seller i ∈ S is given by the expected amount of item i that is sold based on (1) when restricted on the set S (rather than [n]), multiplied by the price of that item, i.e., R i (p(S)) :=p i (S) ·q i (p(S)). Assuming that in the induced Bertrand game (S,p(S), R(p(S))) each seller maximizes its own revenue, the unique pure Nash equilibrium prices can be computed in a closed-form as [1, Theorems 1 & 2] :
where q i (S) is the MNL demand probability (1) computed at the equilibrium prices p(S). Substituting these probabilities from (1) into (2) and solving for equilibrium prices p(S), one can obtain a closed-form solution for the equilibrium prices and the equilibrium demands in terms of "no purchase" probability q 0 (S) as [1, Theorem 2]:
Here V (x) : R + → (0, 1) is a strictly increasing and concave function given by the unique solution of y exp( y 1−y ) = x, and q 0 (S) can be obtained from the unique solution to
Thus, the expected revenue that seller i derives at the Nash equilibrium given the assortment S is offered equals to
where q i (S) is given by (3), and R i (S) = 0, if i / ∈ S. Finally, we let R(S) := i∈S qi(S) 1−qi(S) be the expected revenue obtained by offering the assortment S.
Remark 1: It is clear from (5) that the revenue of an item i depends on the assortment S which is offered. This makes the analysis of assortment dynamics much more complicated than the case where each item i has a fixed revenue R i (S) = r i , ∀S ⊆ [n], regardless of the offered assortment S. In particular, the equilibrium revenues (5) create extra externalities the revenue of an item i depends on what other items are offered with i in an assortment. Now the dynamic optimization problem that is faced by the online platform is to select a sequence of assortments subject to inventory constraints so as to maximize the expected aggregate revenue given by
where S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m are random variables denoting the assortments offered by the platform at time t = 1, 2, . . . , m.
Here, the offered assortments must satisfy the inventory constraints meaning that an item i ∈ [n] can be included in S t at time t only if it is still available at that time, i.e., if its initial c i units are not fully sold to buyers 1, 2, . . . , t − 1.
It is worth noting that the available inventory of an item i at time t not only depend on the assortments offered by the platform up to that time, but also on the realization of the choices that are made by the buyers up to time t. Therefore, an online algorithm must satisfy the inventory constraints for any realized sample path of buyers' choices. Finally, we note that the platform can use either a deterministic or randomized online algorithm, and by an online algorithm we refer to an algorithm that does not know the total number of buyers m, nor it has access to the realized random choices made by them. To evaluate the performance of an online algorithm, we use the notion of competitive ratio as defined next. Definition 1: Given α > 0, an online algorithm for the dynamic assortment problem is called α-competitive if it achieves in expectation an α-fraction of the total revenue obtained by any other offline algorithm that knows the number of buyers m, a priori.
III. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
In this section, we state and prove some preliminary results which will be used later to establish our main result. To devise a competitive algorithm, we first derive an upper bound for the expected revenue that any offline algorithm can obtain and use it as a benchmark to compare the performance of our algorithm with that upper bound. This can be done by writing an LP whose optimal objective value is no less than any other feasible algorithm. This step is fairly standard and has been used in devising competitive algorithms for online assortment and other related problems [12] , [13] , [16] .
For this purpose, let us assume that the number of buyers m is known and consider the following LP whose optimal objective value is denoted by OPT:
Here c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) ′ is the column vector of initial inventories, and q(S) = (q 1 (S), . . . , q n (S)) ′ is the column vector of equilibrium purchasing probabilities, where q i (S) is the equilibrium demand for item i given that assortment S is offered (3). Moreover, for each t,
is a probability vector of variables in the probability simplex ∆ 2 n := {y ≥ 0 : S⊆[n] y(S) = 1}, where y t (S) can be viewed as the probability that the algorithm offers assortment S to the buyer at time t. 1 Thus, the first n constraints in (7) (written in a vector form) capture the inventory constraints.
Next, we show that any online assortment algorithm generates a feasible solution to the LP (7) with an objective value equal to the expected revenue of that algorithm. To see this, let S 1 , . . . , S m be random variables denoting the assortments offered by the algorithm at time steps t = 1, . . . , m. Moreover, let η t be a random variable denoting the item that is purchased by the buyer at time t. Then, for every realized sample path we have m t=1 
Thus, setting y t (S) := P(S t = S) forms a feasible solution to the LP (7) with an objective value equal to the expected revenue of the algorithm, that is m t=1 S R(S)P(S t = S). This shows that OPT provides an upper bound for the revenue obtained by any offline algorithm.
In the rest of this section we prove several lemmas for our later use. We start by the so-called substitutability property.
Lemma 1: For any assortment S and two items
Proof: First note that offering more items reduces the probability of not purchasing any item at the equilibrium. This is because if q 0 (S) denotes the no-purchase probability at the equilibrium, then 1 − q 0 (S) = r∈S V (q 0 (S)e θr−1 ), where V (·) is a strictly increasing function. Now if we offer a larger assortment S∪{j}, we must have q 0 (S∪{j}) ≤ q 0 (S). Otherwise, offering S ∪ {j} can only increase the right-hand side of the former equality while decrease its left-hand side, implying 1−q 0 (S ∪{j}) < r∈S∪{j} V (q 0 (S ∪{j})e θr−1 ). This contradiction shows that q 0 (S ∪ {j}) ≤ q 0 (S). Now by monotonicity of V (·) and using (3) we have,
In other words, offering more items in the assortment reduces the market share for the existing ones. Note that this also implies that the revenue derived from an item i if it is offered in a larger set is less than when it is offered in a smaller set,
. Definition 2: An item i is called heavy if offering it alone obtains at least half of the market share, i.e., q i ({i}) ≥ 1
2 . An item i is called heavier than j if q i ({i}) ≥ q j ({j}). We denote the set of heavy items, if any, by [h] = {1, 2, . . . , h}. We refer to any other item i ∈ {h+1, . . . , n} as a light item.
Remark 2: As we have sorted the items according to their qualities θ 1 ≥ . . . ≥ θ n , using (3) and monotonicity of V (·) one can see that the same order holds on the heaviness of the items, i.e., q 1 ({1}) ≥ . . . ≥ q n ({n}).
Lemma 2: Given an assortment S, let i ∈ [h] be a heavy item that is at least as heavy as any other item in S. Then offering i alone obtains at least half of the expected revenue obtained by offering S, i.e., R(S) ≤ 2R({i}) = 2 qi({i}) 1−qi({i}) . Proof: As i is a heavy item, q i ({i}) ≥ 1 2 . Now let us first assume i ∈ S, meaning that i is the heaviest item in S.
Case I: If q i (S) ≥ 1 2 , by j∈S∪{0} q j (S) = 1, we have j∈S\{i} q j (S) ≤ 1 2 . Thus q j (S) ≤ 1 2 ∀j ∈ S \ {i}, and
where the third inequality holds because qi(S) 1−qi(S) ≥ 1, and the last inequality holds because q i (S) ≤ q i ({i}) by the substitutability property (Lemma 1). Case II: If q i (S) < 1 2 , since i is the heaviest item in S, this means that for every other j ∈ S, q j (S) < 1 2 . As a result,
where the last inequality holds because q i ({i}) ≥ 1 2 . Finally, if i / ∈ S, then either S does not contain any heavy item in which case q j (S) < 1 2 , ∀j ∈ S, and the same chain of inequalities in (8) holds, or S contains at least one heavy item. In the latter case, let k ∈ S be the heaviest item in S. Now using the first part of the proof
. The next lemma shows that in the absence of heavy items, a greedy algorithm achieves a constant competitive ratio.
Lemma 3: Assume every item in the online assortment problem is a light item. Then an online algorithm that at each time offers all the available items is at least 1 4 -competitive. Proof: Consider a virtual online assortment problem with identical initial inventory c and purchase probabilities q(S) as in the original online assortment problem, except that the revenue of an item i is now fixed and equals to some constant R i (S) = r i , ∀S. Using similar argument as in Section III, the optimal offline revenue to the virtual problem is upper bounded by the optimal value of the following LP,
It has been shown in [12, Example 1] that a greedy online algorithm that at time t offers the maximizing assortment
is 1 2 -competitive with respect to OPT(r), where A t denotes the set of available items at time t. Since both the original and virtual assortment problems (as well as their offline LP benchmarks (7) and (9)) share the same inventory constraints, any feasible online algorithm for one is also feasible for the other one. The only difference is in their expected objected revenues given by m t=1 i∈St E qi(St)
1−qi(St)
and m t=1 i∈St E r i q i (S t ) , respectively. However, from Lemma 1 we know that for any assortment S, q i (S) ≤ q i ({i}) < 1 2 . Thus in the absence of heavy items q t i (S) ≤
Denoting the expected revenue of the greedy algorithm on the original and virtual problems by Rev g and Rev v g (r), respectively, a simple coupling implies
where 1 and 2 denote column vectors of dimension n with all entries being 1 and 2, respectively. Finally, at each time t the greedy rule (10) with r = 1 offers the assortment
where by (4) the right-hand side is maximized if S t = A t .
IV. A CONSTANT COMPETITIVE ONLINE ASSORTMENT ALGORITHM In this section, we first describe an online assortment algorithm and then prove its performance guarantee. The proposed algorithm is very simple and requires only sorting the item with an overall computation of O(mn log n). The algorithm is comprised of two phases. In the first phase we first take care of heavy items (if any) by offering them alone until either they are fully sold or no buyer is left. We then take care of the remaining light items by offering them all together in larger bundles. A formal description of this hybrid algorithm which in our analysis we will refer to it as "Alg" is summarized below. Note that since an online algorithm does not know the number of buyers ahead of time, a competitive online algorithm must carefully take into account a trade-off between two scenarios: 1) Increasing the chance of selling items by offering larger assortments (hence reducing prices) if very few buyers are left, and 2) Reducing the competition among the sellers by offering smaller assortments (hence increasing prices) if there are still too many buyers to arrive. In fact, balancing these two cases is the main reason behind the choice of each phase in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 A Hybrid Algorithm
It is worth noting that due to random realization of buyers' choices, the time at which Phase 1 in Algorithm 1 terminates is a random variable τ , which can be at most the number of buyers m. The following lemma shows that for all sample paths that the algorithm has a chance to enter its second phase (i.e., τ < m), the expected revenue obtained during Phase 2 is within a constant factor of the expected revenue obtained by selling light items in the offline benchmark OPT.
Lemma 4: Conditioned on any sample path of length τ < m due to selling heavy items in Phase 1, the expected revenue obtained in Phase 2 is at least 1 4 -fraction of the revenue that light items contribute to OPT after time τ .
Proof: Let {y t } m t=τ +1 be the optimal offline solution to LP 
and notice that (12) is precisely the LP relaxation upper bound for any online algorithm that can be used during Phase 2 with constant revenues r i = 1, ∀i ∈ L. On the other hand, from the second inequality of (11) in the proof of Lemma 3, we know that the greedy algorithm used during Phase 2 obtains at least 1 2 -fraction of the optimal value in (12) . Thus, if there exists a feasible solution to (12) with an objective value of at least D 2 , then we conclude that the revenue of Phase 2 is at least D 4 , completing the proof. Therefore, in the rest of the proof we construct a feasible solution to (12) with an objective value of at least D 2 . Let us fix an arbitrary t ∈ [τ + 1, m] and for simplicity we drop the time superscript t. Define p i := S⊆[n] q i (S)y(S), for i ∈ L, and consider the following auxiliary LP:
Note that (13) is a feasible LP. This is because for any i ∈ L and using substitutability property we have,
implying z(T ) = S:S\[h]=T y(S), T ⊆ L is feasible to (13) . Next we show that the optimal value of (13) is zero. To derive a contradiction, let z * be an optimal solution to (13) with strictly positive objective value and let i * be an item for which T ⊆L q i * (T )z * (T ) − p i * > 0. This means that there exists T * ⊆ L such that i * ∈ T * and z * (T * ) > 0. Note that T * must contain at least another item other than i * . Otherwise if T * = {i * }, reducing z * (T * ) by a small positive amount and increasing z * (∅) by the same amount will give us another feasible with strictly smaller objective value, contradicting the optimality of z * . Now let us partition the items in T * into T * 1 and T * 2 , where T * 1 = {i ∈ T * :
By definition of T * 1 , this means that there exists a positive number ǫ 1 > 0 such that reducing z * (T * ) to z * (T * )−ǫ 1 , i.e., by an abuse of notation setting z * (T * ) = z * (T * ) − ǫ 1 , will preserve the feasibility of all the constraints associated with items i ∈ T * 1 . Note that such a change can only affect the feasibility of the constraints i ∈ T * and has no influence on constraints i / ∈ T * (as q i (T * ) = 0, ∀i / ∈ T * ). Unfortunately, this update violates the constraints i ∈ T * 2 such that in the new solution T ⊆L q i (T )z * (T )−p i = −ǫ 1 q i (T * ), ∀i ∈ T * 2 . However, we will show that one can sequentially redistribute the ǫ 1 -mass that was removed from T * to nested subsets of T * 2 and again satisfy all the constraint in i ∈ T * 2 at equality.
Let ǫ 2 := min i∈T * 2 qi(T * )ǫ1 qi(T * 2 ) , and note that by substitutability property and since T * 2 ⊂ T * , we have ǫ 2 < ǫ 1 . Therefore, returning ǫ 2 amount from ǫ 1 -mass to z * (T * 2 ), i.e., setting z * (T * 2 ) = z * (T * 2 ) + ǫ 2 , each constraint in i ∈ T * 2 becomes "more" feasible as T ⊆L q i (T )z * (T ) − p i = −ǫ 1 q i (T * ) + ǫ 2 q i (T * 2 ) ≤ 0, with at least one constraint, namely the one that achieves argmin i∈T * 2 qi(T * ) qi(T * 2 ) ǫ 1 , is satisfied with equality. Let T * 3 ⊂ T * 2 be all the items in T * 2 that are not satisfied by equality after this update, i.e.,
. Again by substitutability property and since T * 3 ⊂ T * 2 ⊂ T * , for every i ∈ T * 3 we have
≤ ǫ 1 − ǫ 2 , and thus ǫ 3 < ǫ 1 − ǫ 2 . Therefore, relocating ǫ 3 amount of the left over mass ǫ 1 − ǫ 2 to z * (T * 3 ) by setting z * (T * 2 ) = z * (T * 2 ) + ǫ 3 , every constraint in i ∈ T * 3 becomes more feasible as
, with at least one constraint being tight at equality. Repeating this argument inductively, one can see that due to substitutability property we always have enough leftover mass to make one more constrain in T * 2 tight so that at the end of this process all the constraints in T * 2 are satisfied at equality. Finally, denoting the left over mass at the end of this process by ǫ := ǫ 1 − ǫ 2 − ǫ 3 − . . ., we relocate all of that to the empty set by setting z * (∅) = z * (∅) + ǫ. This last step does not affect the feasibility of any constraints and only guarantees that the mass conservation is preserved so that z * ∈ ∆ 2 |L| . Thus, at the end of this process we obtain a feasible solution to (13) with strictly smaller objective value than the initial optimal solution z * , a contradiction. This shows that the optimal objective value of (13) is zero, meaning that there exists z * ∈ ∆ 2 |L| such that T ⊆L q i (T )z * (T ) = S⊆[n] q i (S)y(S), ∀i ∈ L.
Finally, as the above argument holds for any t ∈ [τ + 1, m], we obtain a feasible solution {z * t } m t=τ +1 to (12) that consumes the exact same amount from each resource i ∈ L that is consumes by the optimal offline solution {y t } m t=τ +1 . In particular, the objective value of (12) for the feasible solution {z * t } m t=τ +1 equals to
where the last inequality holds by the fact that for every light item i ∈ L, qi(S) 1−qi(S) ≤ 2q i (S). This completes the proof. Definition 3: We let Ω denote the set of all sample paths that can be realized during the execution of Phase 1 of the algorithm. We define A ⊆ Ω to be the subset of sample paths for which all the heavy items are fully sold during Phase 1, andĀ = Ω \ A be all sample paths for which the algorithm does not even enter its second phase. Proof: Let τ i : Ω → Z + be a random variable denoting the first time that item i ∈ [h] is fully sold during Phase 1 of the algorithm, where we note that τ 1 ≤ . . . ≤ τ h . Therefore, A = {ω ∈ Ω : τ h (ω) ≤ m} is the set of sample paths for which all the heavy items can be fully sold during Phase 1. We first derive a lower bound for the expected revenue of the algorithm conditioned on the sample paths 
Now given any sample path ω ∈ A, using Lemma 2, we can upper bound the revenue of OPT up to time τ 1 (ω) as
Also, the total contribution of item 1 to the value of OPT is:
where the first inequality is by the substitutability property, and the second inequality is because {y t (S)} is a feasible solution to (7) . As we have accounted the total contribution of item 1 to OPT in the above, we can safely remove item 1 from all the assortments offered by OPT and upper bound the remaining revenue of OPT over
where the first inequality is by the substitutability property, and the second inequality is from Lemma 2 (as the heaviest item in S \ {1} at the best can be item 2). In particular, the total contribution of item 2 to the value of OPT is:
.
Again, we can safely remove item 2 from all the assortments in OPT and repeat the same process until all the heavy items are completely removed from the assortments offered by OPT. At the end of this process, we are only left with light items whose contribution to the OPT is
1−qi(S) y t (S). But from Lemma 4, this value is at most 4E[R(Phase 2)|ω], where the expectation is with respect to buyers' random choices during the second phase of the algorithm. Thus for every sample path ω ∈ A, we have shown that OPT is upper bounded by
where by convention τ 0 := 0. Taking conditional expectation E[·|A] from this inequality over all ω ∈ A we get
But we note that
. This is because knowing that a sample path ω is in A puts a cap m on the length of the random variable τ i − τ i−1 , which can only result in a smaller expected value. On the other hand, E[τ i − τ i−1 ] = ci qi({i}) . This is because for any t ∈ (τ i−1 , τ i ] the expected amount of item i being sold is q i ({i}), independently from other time instances, which implies that in expectation item i can last for ci qi({i}) many time steps. Combining this relation with the above inequality we obtain,
where the last inequality is due to (14) . Finally, we prove our main result in the following theorem which is the first constant competitive algorithm for the online assortment problem. Here, to keep our analysis simple we do not optimize on the choice of parameters. However, we should mention that using tighter concentration inequalities rather than Markov's inequality the competitive ratio for the same algorithm can be significantly improved. The main idea of the proof is to show that if the algorithm does not have a chance to enter its second phase it is because the number of buyers m is small, or otherwise, the revenue obtained from Phase 1 is sufficiently large compared to OPT. Proof: Let c := h i=1 c i be the total number of heavy items, and define B ⊆Ā to be the subset of sample paths in A that sell at least a heavy items during Phase 1, for some a ≤ min{m, c} to be determined later. More precisely, let X : Ω → Z + be a random variable denoting the number of sold heavy items during Phase 1, and note that X ≤ m. Then, B := {ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) > a, τ h (ω) > m}. We have
where the first inequality is by Markov's inequality and the second inequality is because
On the other hand, we know that at each time that a heavy item i is offered, it is sold independently with a probability of at least q i ({i}) ≥ 1 2 . Therefore, E[X] ≥ 1 2 min{m, c}. Combining this with the above inequality we obtain,
Now consider an arbitrary sample path ω ∈ B that sells X(ω) ≥ a heavy items. To upper bound the revenue of OPT, let i ∈ [h] be the last heavy item which is sold over ω. From Lemma 2 and using a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 5, we know that OPT can achieve a revenue of at most 2R(Alg|ω) + i−1 j=1 ci 1−qj ({j}) ≤ 3R(Alg|ω) during its first X(ω) time instances and by selling all the heavy items 1, 2, . . . , i − 1. We can then remove the heavy items 1, 2, . . . , i − 1 from all the assortments offered by the OPT after time X(ω), in which case the remaining assortments offered by OPT over [X(ω) + 1, m] can only contain item i or lighter items. Using Lemma 2 this means that the revenue of each remaining assortment in OPT is at most twice of the revenue of the individual assortment {i}. Thus, the remaining revenue obtained by OPT over [X(ω) + 1, m] is at most (m − X(ω)) 2qi({i}) 1−qi({i}) . As the algorithm sells X(ω) items of type i or heavier over ω, we have qi({i}) 
where x := a m ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, by Markov's inequality,
and thus P(A) ≥ max{0, 1 − 2c m }. Substituting this relation into (16) and maximizing with respect to x ∈ (0, 1), while considering the worst ratio by minimizing over c m > 0, the competitive ratio of the algorithm is at least
Finally, solving the above min-max problem one can easily see that the competitive ratio of Algorithm 1 is at least E[R(Alg)] OP T ≥ 0.084, that is obtained for x = 0.13.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered an online assortment problem under a discriminatory control model where the online platform can only display a subset of sellers to arriving buyers. This induces competition among displayed sellers such that the sellers set the price of their items based on the Nash equilibrium of the Bertrand game. We addressed the problem of finding a competitive online algorithm under inventory constraints when each item has limited quantity and the number of upcoming buyers is not known. This is a challenging problem due to the coupling between the revenue of the items, the offered assortments, and the inventory constraints. However, we showed that a simple hybrid algorithm achieves a constant competitive ratio and can be implemented in polynomial time O(nm log n), where n is the number of items and m is the number of buyers.
